# AFF

## Framework

### AT: Framework is Racist

#### Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are good – nothing more nothing less – framework isn’t policing

Anderson, Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, 6

[Amanda Anderson , Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290, AMM]

Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

### Framework Key to Democracy

#### Effective argumentation is better able to create broader inclusion---radical rejection of existing systems as exclusionary is ineffective and reductionist

Anderson, Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, 6

[Amanda Anderson , Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290, AMM]

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

## Link Answers

### No Link – Faulty Assumptions

#### No Link - The K makes broad, faulty assertions about the nature of security studies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

One assertion is central to H&RM’s article, dominating the abstract: that the concepts of securitization and desecuritization are distributed in time and space so that securitization is a threatening re-regression lurking in a backward black Africa, while desecuritization is a reasoned, liberal, civilized dialogue characteristic of Europe (and our prescribed future). We already debunked their attempt to pose Europe as the poster child for desecuritization. H&RM depict Africa as the essence of securitization, but offer no reason why Africa should be seen as constitutive for the theory. The foundational misunderstanding in H&RM’s article on which their whole argument hangs is an alleged ‘conceptualization of “normal politics” as reasoned, civilized dialogue’ (H&RM, 2020: 3 [1]). In Buzan et al. (1998), we write: Of course, places do exist where secrecy or violation of rights is the rule and where security arguments are not needed to legitimize such acts. The earlier illustrations were for a liberal-democratic society; in other societies there will also be ‘rules,’ as there are in any society, and when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics,’ we have a case of securitization. (Buzan et al., 1998: 24–25, emphasis added)

Thus, quite explicitly, ‘normal politics’ is not a politics with some specific attributes (‘liberal’, ‘civilized’, ‘reasoned’); it is whatever passed as normal until an exception was installed through securitization. H&RM do not consult the existing secondary literature on this, but instead repeatedly restate their own (false) definition that ‘normal politics’ means reasoned, liberal, civilized dialogue. From there, they associate freely into this being ‘a teleological hierarchy of civilizational advancement from securitization towards politicization’ (H&RM, 2020: 8 [6]). This characterization they support with a reference to pp. 53 and 69 in the Framework book. It looks damning when H&RM write thus and back it with a reference; but, if you read those pages, there is absolutely no hint of securitization-to-politicization being cast in evolutionary or civilizational terms. Their article contains dozens of similar instances, where they make a reference to our texts but what you find there is not what they claim.

Significantly, their definition of ‘normal politics’ could not work for securitization theory, because, as argued very strongly by Wæver (2011, 2015), the theory needs a clean concept of securitization as a distinct operation that is contrasted simply to the non-securitized (called ‘normal politics’), not a substantial concept of ‘normal politics’ as holding particular teleological (e.g. liberal democratic) qualities. Securitization is an ‘operation’ that is available for deployment and contestation in all societies at all times. The unprofessional citation practices of H&RM are the smaller problem; the big one is that they don’t read. They inject elements into the theory that both aren’t there and couldn’t be there. Methodology matters.

H&RM avoid understanding the theory they are attacking. On the second page of their article, they state that securitization theory has been attractive because ‘it provides a clear set of steps and standards for . . . deciding whether [the referent objects] should indeed be “securitized”’ (H&RM, 2020: 4 [2]). No. The theory does not aim to guide when something ‘should be securitized’. It is a framework for analysing what happens when something is securitized and the politics of struggles over this act. It is argued systematically in all the major works (and has been a common target of criticism) that securitization theory cannot and will not prescribe when something ‘should be securitized’. H&RM make no attempt to present the securitization theory project, its animating agenda, and the political or academic setting into which the texts intervened. If they had explained what the theory and the key texts were designed to achieve, they simply could not argue as they do

### No Link - Security not Racist

#### No link- racism isn’t the foundation of security studies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

H&RM generally use quotations radically out of context. They never study what is done in the texts they are ‘reading’. They say nothing about their own methodology or data selection and give no principles for interpretation. They do not define racism (see response by Lene Hansen [2020]), and they don’t discuss at all what it means to read a theory and judge whether it is racist. Given that this is the theme of the article, it is disturbing that Security Dialogue has published it. Despite H&RM’s repeated assertions about something being ‘foundational’ to securitization theory, they do not follow any standards for how to find what is ‘foundational’ for, or ‘structures’, a theory. If there is a methodology at play, it is deepfake in the sense that if you break a corpus of text down into small fragments, you can reassemble it to say anything you want. Deepfake as analogy does not imply any claim about intentional falsehood. The analogy is to the technique: making somebody ‘speak’ by using splinters from them reassembled to produce meaning disconnected from the original texts. H&RM present no theoretical framework. We can’t backtrack their theoretical position from scattered citations. Impressive forerunners do exactly what they don’t: Stoler (1995) and Mills (1997) trace meticulously how their analysed theorists struggle to do specific things, and then what role race plays in enabling this. H&RM, in contrast, ignore what securitization theory attempts and how it works.

### No Link – Security Intersectional

#### Generic link homogenizes international relations, prefer situated and empirical evidence

Gomes, Federal University of Santa Maria Brazil Social Sciences Professor and Marques, Federal University International Relations researcher, 21 (Mariana Selister and Renata Rodrigues , “Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 78-87, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

The concept of intersectionality is essential for understanding the main structures of modem society - patriarchy, racism, and capitalism - that demarcate people’s lives and political processes, and, consequently, the dynamics of international security. These social structures that interact with each other create the categories of women, race, and class (Davis, 1981) that segregate and hier- archize social groups. In dialogue with intersectional theory, decolonial feminism (Lugones, 2010) places these three dimensions in an international perspective, emphasizing the idea of coloniality. Thus, patriarchy, racism, and capitalism are the main social structures strongly demarcated by historical colonialism and its roots in the economy, politics and culture that persist to the present day, establishing what Lugones defines as the ‘colonial/modem gender system’.

Although these concepts can lead to different paths of analysis, their epistemological common ground allows us to advocate that coloniality, racialization, and genderization are products of his- torical constmctions, neither universal nor essential. Culturally and historically situated analysis of securitization processes has the capacity to incorporate social classification configurations such as racialization and genderization, although we do not see this happening very often. We intend to illustrate in the next section how the conduct of empirical research plays a decisive role in efforts to analyze the social configurations of power in securitization processes.

## Impacts

### Case Outweighs – Extinction

#### Existential threats outweigh – correct cognitive biases against them

Farquhar et al 17 (Sebastian, former head of the global priorities project, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance.” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>, Accessed 7/17/20, GDI – JMoore)

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK

In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction:

I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes:

(1) Peace.

(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s ex- isting population.

(3) A nuclear war that kills 100%.

(2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible his- tory to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65

In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of pre- venting existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67

Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument.

In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71

However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks.

1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In spite of the importance of existential risk re- duction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international co- operation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks.

1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in

There are several reasons why existential risk re- duction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest.

Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs.

Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available.

Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled.

Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People be- come numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### Case Outweighs – Russia Adv

#### The K sanitizes russian authoritarianism

**Dearment,**senior reporter at MedCity News covering biotech **22** (Alaric Dearment, , 2-14-2022,  Above the Law, "Russia Plays Western ‘Anti-War’ Left For Fools - Above the Law", https://abovethelaw.com/2022/02/russia-plays-western-anti-war-left-for-fools/ accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

The basic premise of these ideas is that the US and NATO should do nothing substantial to deter Russia from invading and then sit on their hands if it actually does invade. The bigger question is why so many leftists who claim to be anti-war and anti-imperialist would give succor to Russia as it engages in the very warmongering and imperialism they claim to deplore.

One possible reason is a longstanding binary worldview that sees the US as the main cause of the world’s problems and so irredeemably evil that it praises any nation opposing its interests – e.g., the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia in the present, China, Venezuela or Syria. This inevitably leads to double standards when it comes to imperialism and human rights abuses and a tendency to blame the US and its allies first.

The Iraq war didn’t help either, giving rise to isolationism and kneejerk cynicism about American foreign policy whereby anything emanating from the Pentagon or State Department is assumed to be a lie. But unlike Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Russia’s forces amassed along Ukraine’s border are clearly visible.

Another is Russian propaganda, disseminated by state-owned outlets like RT and Sputnik. They have been tremendously successful at pumping pro-Russian ideas into Western political discourse while also promoting anti-system populist politics aimed at exacerbating divisions and destabilizing democracies. Kremlin propagandists can count every Westerner sincerely arguing Russia has “legitimate concerns” about “NATO expansion” as a success story.

But a larger reason is a failure to admit what Russia actually is and always has been, which is a colonial empire, every bit as much as its Spanish, British and French counterparts. The differences are that it was an empire of land rather than sea, and that with the collapse of the monarchy in 1917 it slapped a left-wing revolutionary coat of paint onto a state that remained just as imperialist as when the tsars ruled from Petrograd.

That’s why Georgia’s first tenure as a democratic republic after declaring independence in 1918 lasted only three years, ending with the Red Army invading and taking over the country in 1921. Armenia and independence movements in Central Asia experienced similar fates.

Consequently, the decolonization that Spain, the UK and other European powers underwent after World War II didn’t come to Russia until 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. That decolonization is what Putin referred to as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” in 2005.

But where other former European colonial powers are content to let their former colonies govern their own affairs, Putin cannot tolerate former Russian colonies doing the same. That’s why pro-democratic uprisings in post-Soviet countries – most recently Belarus and Kazakhstan – scare him so much and is likely the reason he has his eyes on Ukraine. After all, a Ukraine that is free, democratic and prosperous and enjoys close ties with the West threatens his ill-gotten power and wealth, as it might cause Russians to start asking why they can’t have democracy and prosperity too.

If a war breaks out in Europe, it will happen because a predatory, kleptocratic mafia state presided over by a psychopathic dictator started it. It will be because all the diplomacy in the world could not stop Putin’s revanchist desire to restore Soviet power. Undermining efforts to prevent that from happening or punish Putin’s regime if he does invade isn’t anti-war.

### Case Outweighs - War turns Racism

#### War outweighs and turns every impact

Horgan 14 (John, “War Is Our Most Urgent Problem--Let’s Solve It.” Scientific America, 8/12/20, <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/war-is-our-most-urgent-problem-let-8217-s-solve-it/>, Accessed 7/17/20, GDI – JMoore)

Is there a more urgent problem in the world today than war? And when I say "war" in this post, I mean also militarism, the culture of war, the armies, arms, industries, policies, plans, propaganda, prejudices, rationalizations that make lethal group conflict not only possible but also likely.

My answer to the above question: No, there is no more urgent problem than war. Not climate change, pollution, overpopulation, oppression, poverty, inequality, hunger, disease.

If you seek solutions to any of these problems, you should also devote at least some effort to ending war, for several reasons. First, war exacerbates or perpetuates our other problems, either directly or by draining precious resources away from their solution. War subverts democracy and promotes tyranny and fanaticism; kills and sickens and impoverishes people; ravages nature. War is a keystone problem, the eradication of which would make our other social problems much more tractable.

Second, war is more readily solvable than many other human afflictions. War is not like a hurricane, earthquake or Ebola plague, a natural disaster foisted on us by forces beyond our control. War is entirely our creation, the product of human choices. War could end tomorrow if a relatively small group of people around the world chose to end it.

Third, more than any of our other problems, war represents a horrific moral crime. Particularly when carried out by the U.S. and other nations, or by groups that aspire to or claim the legitimacy of states, war makes hypocrites of us and makes a mockery of human progress. We cannot claim to be civilized as long as war or even the threat of war persists.

Yes, annual war casualties have declined sharply since the cataclysmic first half of the 20th century. Over the last few decades, war has killed far fewer people than cancer or automobile accidents. But in our heavily—and nuclear—armed world, war is a few decisions away from becoming exponentially more destructive. And even the killing of a single child by a U.S. drone, Israeli rocket or Syrian tank is an abomination that corrupts us all.

## Permutation

### Perm – Do Both: Eclecticism

#### Perm – Do Both – Security is contingent not a fixed construct, approaching perm as eclecticism best way to evaluate and synthesize disparate paradigms.

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

I argue here that one of the appropriate reparative possibilities for critical security studies lies in eclecticism. Those who have employed eclecticism in the past have described it as a process through which scholars trespass paradigmatic boundaries and combine insights from different par- adigms to analyse a given problem (Makinda, 2000a; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). For example, Katzenstein and Sil have argued that ‘eclecticism is distinguished by the fact that features of analy- ses in theories initially embedded in separate research traditions can be separated from their respective foundations, translated meaningfully, and recombined as part of an original permuta- tion of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics’ (Katzenstein and Sil, 2008: 110-111, emphasis in original). Earlier, I had defined eclecticism ‘as a process through which a theorist constructs a coherent analytical approach by utilizing, synthesizing and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms’ (Makinda, 2000b: 398). I posited that eclecticists would need to meet some conditions. ‘First, they would need to recognize, but at the same time refuse to be confined by, paradigmatic horizons’ (Makinda, 2000b: 400). Explaining that eclecticism had the potential to emancipate scholars from paradigmatic constraints, I argued that the refusal by eclecticists ‘to be bound by paradigmatic boundaries requires acknowledgement that these socio-mental constrictions are not fixed, but contingent’ (Makinda, 2000b: 400). I added that eclecticism could be used to ‘explore the possibilities of pursuing an [international relations] discipline that takes account of the percep- tions of us/them, self/other and inside/outside in non-European traditions’ (Makinda, 2000b: 399).

### Perm – Do Both: Eclecticism – 1AR

#### Claims to alt exclusivity turns the K

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

While critical security studies emerged from a cross-fertilization of ideas, cultures and traditions representing different parts of the world, it has increasingly been made to identify itself with European values, traditions and thoughts that go back to the critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment. This identification with one source of ideas has meant that critical security studies continues to exclude from the conversation a large part of the world that gave birth to it. The con- clusion is that critical security studies has not only missed the benefits that come with the cross- fertilization of ideas, but also alienated itself from its own foundations. Moreover, by aspiring to become a paradigm that competes with other security studies para- digms for hegemony, critical security studies has unwittingly compromised some of its principles and ethical commitments. The strength of critical security studies comes from its ability to expose the forces of oppression and domination, but it cannot do so effectively when it is promoting the hegemony of ideas associated with Gramsci and the Frankfurt School. It also cannot consistently seek to eliminate exclusion and advocate inclusion when it is establishing its own strict boundary lines.

#### Perm solves -

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

I recommend eclecticism as a reparative possibility for critical security studies through which the competing research programmes would be on a par. One of its benefits is that it can provide a platform for negotiating over, and mediating, the competing normative and political agendas that underpin paradigms. As Neufeld (1993) has argued, reflexivity acknowledges that differences between international relations paradigms are inherently normative and that ‘reasoned assessment’ can adjudicate between competing normative claims. With such an approach, it would be our hon- esty, our willingness to engage in dialogue with those who may disagree with us and our readiness to acknowledge our debts to fellow scholars that will pave the way for a robust, inclusive and ethi- cal critical security studies.

### Perm – Do Both (Abolition)

#### Perm – Do Both – Embrace vulnerability and fugitivity challenges colonial impulse to mastery, collapsing activism and academia

Manchanda, Queen Mary University London International Politics Senior Lecturer, 21 (Dr Nivi, “The banalization of race in international security studies: From absolution to abolition”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 49-59, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

In the third and final instance, and somewhat counter-intuitively, international security studies can turn to alternate modes of knowing that reject the foreclosure inherent in colonial and raced understandings of concepts such as ‘liberty’ and ‘security’. Bamor Hesse (2014: 288) ventures that the cherished notion of ‘liberty’ emerges through a ‘hegemony of Western formulation’ that denies its ‘indebtedness to Western colonialism’. This holds equally true for ‘security’ and for synthetic accounts of ‘ontological insecurity’, ‘securitization theory’ and ‘deterrence’ at the crux of the (sub) discipline. One way out of this impasse is for international security studies to be open to what Julietta Singh (2017: 21) has called a ‘vulnerable reading’. A vulnerable reading of international security studies’ own history and the challenges it faces both in its theory and in practice would go against its colonial impulse towards ‘mastery’ (J. Singh, 2017) and instead expand the conditions of possibility for the field. Pushing further, embracing ‘vulnerability’ as a strategy would mount a wholesale challenge to the conventional objectives of international security studies and its auxil- iary concept ‘resilience’. Vulnerability necessarily engenders exposure, as opposed to foreclosure. In the context of a pandemic, it might entail pushing back against medical police (McQuade and Neocleous, 2020) and resisting greater border violence, even as they appear warranted. This ‘open- ing up’ of international security studies both politically and strategically is not a panacea, but can function as an important remedial step. Coupled with an engagement with the Black radical tradi- tion’s notion of ‘fugitivity’- a form of ‘political escape from the Western hegemony’ (Hesse, 2014: 302) and the colonial architecture of knowledge - vulnerability proffers a question if not an answer: what does it mean to escape from immurement by conventional (read: raced) notions of security?

Nonetheless, if de-raced notions of security offer only a contradiction, then to begin to answer the question one must once again turn to abolition. Abolition looks at connections - between polic- ing and border violence, between the incarceration of indigenous populations, detainees and people of colour and their continued dispossession, expropriation and extraction. Robin Kelley (2020) succinctly captures its tenor thus: ‘Abolition works to dismantle systems that have caused harm, namely police and prisons, and reallocate funds to social and economic resources, and to develop new systems of community-controlled public safety and restorative justice’. This purposeful diversion of funds, resources and other energies away from the structural violence of state-sponsored militarism, to alternate political projects, requires astute research and scholarly analysis. By continuing to uphold the tactical separation of ‘activism’ and ‘academia’ and subli- mating ‘race’ as an exclusive concern of the former domain, in keeping with its political theory and international relations antecedents, international security studies ensures racial events remain for- ever ‘banalized’. Challenging this assumed incommensurability and putting activism, policy and scholarship back in their relational context would allow international security studies to also dis- card some of its ahistoricity, specifically with regard to its colonial roots.

These strategies are not light-touch; they cannot be simply appropriated and tacked on in an attempt to shed the anachronism of international security studies, but require a fundamental - and relational - volte face that many would no doubt argue is impossible for a discipline so steeped in, and governed by, the logics of coloniality. Indeed, as we have seen, ‘security’ is a key node in the racialized theoretical apparatus of not only international relations but also political theory. Nevertheless, a sustained effort to undo and unlearn - to denaturalize - the categories of both the ‘lecture hall’ and the ‘professional journal’, to perform what Harney and Moten (2013: 36) call ‘the enactment of a security breach’ ad nauseam, can fashion a break from international security stud- ies’ racial filiation. A ‘decolonial’ discipline may not be achievable, but an anti-racist one is not just possible but also essential. The politics of recognition and repentance is not enough. To paraphrase Ruth Wilson Gilmore (forthcoming): in order to change security studies, we have to change everything.

### Perm – Non-Reformist Reform (Abolition)

#### Perm – do the aff as non-reformist reform Reform and abolition operate on a continuum – pragmaticism and calls for abolition not mutually exclusive. Filter the link debate through question of quantification of how the aff worsens the status quo outlined by both the k and the aff

\*disorientation is generative and resolves the residual link

**Ben‑Moshe, 2018**

(Liat - Criminology, Law and Justice, University of Illinois- Chicago, “Dis‑epistemologies of Abolition” Critical Criminology (2018) 26:341–355, August 3 2018 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-9403-1> accessed GDI-TM)

A related critique posed against abolition, is that carceral abolition also actively opposes certain kinds of solutions and desires. Abolition critiques the carceral system and carceral logics, but also critiques efforts to reform carceral sites, because some of the factors lead- ing to the growth of the carceral State were the direct result of attempts to reform the sys- tem. This is also directly linked to the lineage of abolition of slavery. As Kim Gilmore (2000) explains, “The connections between slavery and imprisonment have been used by abolitionists as a historical explanation and as part of a radical political strategy that ques- tions the feasibility of “reform” as an appropriate response to prison expansion.”

In practice, reform and abolition are on a continuum. For example, in Politics of Abo- lition, Mathiesen (1974) follows Andre Gorz’s distinction between reformist and ‘non- reformist’ reforms. Reformist reforms are situated in the status quo, so that any changes are made within or against this existing framework. Non reformist reforms imagine a different horizon and are not limited by a discussion of what is possible at present. Mathiesen states

that non-reformist reforms that are effective need to be of the abolishing kind. The question is what kinds of reforms are sought and whether they will strengthen the system in the long run (Ben-Moshe 2013; Kaba 2014). For instance, fighting for adequate health care for pris- oners is something abolitionists often support, as a non-reformist reform. However, some initiatives such as mental health jails are opposed by abolitionists, as these would only expand the scope of incarceration in the long haul.

But, critics say, if everything offered can be conceived as being reformist, what solu- tions does the abolitionist offer? I suggest that this question is rooted in the kind of episte- mological assumptions that are better abandoned by abolitionists. This demand only makes sense if it is engrained in privileged positionality and not in intersectional subjugated knowledge, or maroonage, as those already oppressed do not feel secure in the first place. In short, as Ahmed (2010a) explains, this is the work of the feminist killjoy: “Feminists, by declaring themselves feminists, are already read as destroying something that is thought of by others not only as being good but as the cause of happiness” (2010a: 581). Feminists (and other affect aliens, as Ahmed refers to them, including abolitionists) “hence brings others down, not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but by exposing how happiness is sustained, by erasing the signs of not getting along” (2010a: 582). If we take this one step further to intersectional struggles “The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics” (2010a: 583).

The call of “don’t talk about it unless you have a solution” assumes there is a monolithic answer to the question of ‘what is to be done’. As Davis (2003) contends, as abolitionists, thinking about substitutions to prisons or incarceration is inapt. Instead we should concep- tualize a world without the footprint of the prison. That is exactly the problem with car- ceral locales—such as detention centers, psych hospitals, prisons—they become catch all solutions to diverse social issues. One of the difficulties of conceptualizing a world without prisons is that many think about a monolithic system that will replace the punitive one we have now. Instead, we will need to deal with to handle certain harms and their effects in a myriad of ways.

Abolitionists work on a case by case basis in their campaigns, research and calls for action. They are often in a position of not knowing what to do. This seeming chasm between pragmatism and vision for the future of a non-carceral society are not necessar- ily binary opposites, especially if we think about it through the duality of the both/and approach suggested by Harbin (2016) in relation to the epistemology of disorientation as being generative.

## Alternative

### Alternative Fails – Rejection Bad

#### Essentializing critiques of security studies restricts productive engagements with the field

**van Munster**, Danish Institute for International Studies**, 21** (Rens, 2021,  Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 88–97, "On whiteness in criticalsecurity studies: The case of nuclear weapons", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211015029?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

Following Bhambra, Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s diagnosis is driven by a suspicion that central approaches in critical security studies may inadvertently reproduce racialized forms of exclusion and violence. Suspicion has a rich history in critical theorizing. Paul Ricœur (1970) famously coined the notion of ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ to denote an analytical ethos that he associated with Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. In his view, these authors shared a commitment towards exposing the truth hidden beneath the surface appearance of reality. Things, in other words, are not what they seem. The hermeneutics of suspicion continues to play a significant role today – for example, in the idea of speaking truth to power – and informs various international relations approaches, including some forms of realist theory. In critical security studies, however, the hermeneutics of suspicion has given way to a different form of suspicion, one that does not seek to uncover the real intentions or interests behind or beneath discourse but instead explores the systematic reproduction of violence and exclusions through discourse and practice. It is a form of critique that is suspicious about the context, uptake and circulation of concepts and theories, and what is lost, marginalized or silenced in the (re)production of that knowledge. Howell and Richter-Montpetit are explicit that their analysis is of the latter kind. Their claim is not that critical security studies scholars secretly pursue a racist agenda under the veneer of science, but that central concepts in critical security studies, such as biopolitics or securitization, perform racial work and, in doing so, contribute to the reproduction of racial hierarchies and white supremacy

Bearing in mind that international relations theory, including critical international relations theory, has contributed to the reproduction and hence naturalization of whiteness in world politics, a healthy dose of suspicion about epistemic racism and methodological whiteness is clearly warranted (see, for example, Hobson, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2020; Vitalis, 2015). Yet there are also some in-built limits to the critical ethos of suspicion. In Ricœur’s original formulation, the limit is that of a structural paranoia grounded in a profound mistrust of reality. Paranoia can be a productive force, but is also unidirectional, anticipatory and elitist (the claim to have privileged access to a truth hidden from others) (for a discussion, see Sedgwick, 1997). The kind of suspicion Howell and RichterMontpetit subscribe to seeks to transcend the limits of paranoia. It abandons the idea of a layered reality and sidesteps the issue of intentions and interests (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 4). Still, similar problems remain. In particular, the fallacy of essentialism looms large. In Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s analysis, such essentialism manifests itself in their conviction that the epistemic racism they identify in the Copenhagen School is inescapable and automatically reproduced with every attempt at rearticulation. For them, any recuperation of securitization theory is doomed to repeat the original sin of racism – just as securitization theory itself cannot but repeat the racism present in the work of authors on which it draws (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 7–9). It is worth citing their conclusion in length:

Once classic securitization theory is stripped of its racist conceptual and methodological apparatus . . . there is very little left. Perhaps what remains is simply the word ‘securitization’. But even this word is potentially problematic, because inherent in it is a temporal move from normal politics towards the (exceptional) violence of security. Authors attempting to recuperate the term ‘securitization’ must take care not to indulge in white nostalgia for a better, more innocent time: a time that does not exist for those who have been subject to colonialism or the racial contract on scales from the local to the global – that is to say, the majority of the world’s people. Such a recuperative intellectual project, if at all possible, has yet to be articulated. (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 17)

Suspicion can serve the critical objective of historicizing and contextualizing seemingly abstract or neutral concepts such as securitization or biopolitics, but here it transforms into an essentialist argument that instead fixes the meaning and character of words, concepts and theories across time and space. Characterized by a unidirectional anticipation of the future, such a view entails that structural forms of injustice, such as epistemic racism, can be simply presumed to follow every time the ‘S-word’ is uttered. As an intellectual strategy, such a finalistic version of suspicion does not serve the field of critical security studies well. Indeed, Howell and Richter-Montpetit fail to acknowledge that almost every empirical ‘application’ of securitization theory has involved a serious rearticulation of its core concepts and their relations. These rearticulations could, of course, reproduce problematic assumptions about race that taint the empirical analysis or foreclose important avenues of inquiry, but this is not a matter that can be adjudicated in advance. Nor is it true that such recuperative projects do not exist. For example, Claudia Aradau’s (2004) radical rearticulation of desecuritization seems to avoid the pitfalls Howell and Richter-Montpetit associate with the Copenhagen School. Her work, as well as that of others, shows that thinking with a theory often also involves thinking against that theory and illustrates how new or more progressive interpretations often cannot exist without prior ones.

In addition, the risk of confirmation bias – the tendency for an analyst to read selectively and overlook or exclude examples that do not fit her or his assumptions – looms large in such essentialist forms of suspicion. Despite significant differences in tone, both Lene Hansen’s (2020) rejoinder and the response by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan (2020) point out that Howell and RichterMontpetit’s analysis of securitization theory suffers from this methodological fallacy. Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s critique of Foucauldian security studies admittedly leaves more room for recuperative readings,4 but at times runs up against similar problems. For example, it is not evident on the basis of what criteria the field of Foucauldian security studies is delineated, and at times it appears set up in such a way as to corroborate pre-existing suspicions.5 To be sure, theories and concepts may at times come with heavy historical baggage that overdetermines their meaning. Still, even then, the criticality of a rearticulation depends not just on the theories and thinkers invoked, but also on what such an engagement forecloses or opens up. Suspicion is an indispensable part of critical theorizing but can also unduly restrict productive engagements with prior work, including critical security studies’ own intellectual ancestry.

### Alternative Fails – No Real World Solvency

#### No Alternative spillover – won’t change real world policymaking

Satoh, Co-Director IAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy, 21 (Haruko, Osaka University “Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order”, Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, <https://www.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/HPI-Journal-Vol-8.pdf#page=54>, GDO accessed 7/8/22)

Needless to say, the theoretical and philosophical discussions for this less state-centric definition of security are anchored in the English school and liberal internationalists. But more often than not their contribution is obscured by the disagreements within the aca- demic discipline of international relations theory, if they are not pitted against the dominant realists and neo-realists to compete for an authoritative voice. A discernable challenge is how much impact the academic, theoretical debates have on policymakers, particularly those in the foreign and security policy community of great powers. This is not to say that the theoretical world that offers a more nuanced approach to international relations has had no bearing on the real policy world and conducts of great powers. Nor do the realists, particularly prevalent in the US, only see the world in the classical balance of military power terms, if only because of the “discovery” of the utility of power of persuasion, or soft power, as an effective tool of American diplomacy in winning friends in the Cold War. But in mainstream policy discussions about geopolitical competition between the US and China, there appears little room for nuance.

### Alternative Fails - Flawed Methodologies

#### Reject the K- their foundational authors based their work on numerous flawed methodologies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

Replying, we face a difficult dilemma. The methodology and academic standards of the H&RM piece are so profoundly and systematically flawed as to void the authors’ argument, and we think the lack of credible supporting evidence makes their charge libellous. To properly demonstrate the depth and extent of H&RM’s errors and misrepresentations requires a full, point-by-point critique. Yet, during a lengthy correspondence with Security Dialogue, the editors insisted that if we submitted our critique as a reply it should comply with the standard length of 4,000 words2 and refused simultaneous publication with H&RM’s article. They claimed to see no difference between a charge of racism and normal academic disputes about facts, methods or theories, and therefore no case for amending their normal practice. They furthermore insisted on reviewing our reply: the editors want to be judge and jury as well as defendants. Consequently, we are reluctant to publish this reply in Security Dialogue at all. Within a 4,000-word limit, we can hardly begin to lay out the full details of H&RM’s poor scholarship, let alone explore the more general, and very serious, questions this affair raises for the discipline of international relations and the fight against racism. There is a case for denying the authors and Security Dialogue the oxygen of discussion that they seem to hope for in publishing such toxic and outlandish charges. We decided to offer a short reply in Security Dialogue only to state our principled views and to open a portal from the epicentre of the affair to a detailed reply.

What follows addresses only highlights of the catalogue of methodological and conceptual errors in H&RM’s article. The full reply, which interested readers hopefully will consult, leaves almost nothing of H&RM’s argument standing. This dispiriting affair raises important questions for the discipline of international relations that we can only hint at here but address in our longer reply: • How can and should international relations take on structural/systemic racism? • What are criteria for evidence by which one can identify the inner logic of a theory in order to critique its foundations? • How well or badly do H&RM reflect the background literatures they draw upon? • What can securitization theory actually do and not do when applied to the scourge of racism? • Is racism such a uniquely damaging force that the academic struggle against it warrants violating scholarly norms and potentially sacrificing the private and professional integrity of non-racist colleagues? • What are the responsibilities of academic journals when confronted with works like H&RM’s article?

H&RM’s article could perhaps best be used as a teaching tool for how not to make an academic argument. The kind of deepfake methodology it employs should have no place in academic debates and should certainly not be published in a reputable journal. The errors come in various forms of which we can here only give the flavour.

If H&RM deem various classical authors (Arendt, Schmitt, Hobbes, Durkheim, Foucault) racist, then securitization theory, and by implication the present authors, are also racist for citing them. This destructive tactic is the main basis for their charge against us of civilizationism (H&RM, 2020: 7–11 [5–9]). By this standard, it would be hard to find anyone in international relations who did not qualify as racist. Aside from the considerable room for contesting whether some of these authors (e.g. Arendt) qualify as racist, there is the question of whether tinges of racism, or even wholesale embracing of it, should disqualify a thinker’s work in toto. H&RM’s mode of presenting these accusations implies that everybody should ignore in their entirety the works of key thinkers, both Western and non-Western, up to 1945, who lived in times when racism was a widely accepted norm in most societies and who did not go out of their way to contest that norm. This requirement would eliminate most of the intellectual legacy of the humanities and social sciences. Do we as a discipline become better at analysing politics by leaving out references to Hobbes, because if we cite him our writings become racist? ‘Don’t engage with the tradition. Start anew every time.’ This is the unarticulated argument in H&RM’s article. A presentist and anti-intellectual future looms large. If you who are reading this have ever cited anybody who might have been inspired by someone who can be seen as racist, be prepared for your turn in the dock.

H&RM mobilize Foucauldian security studies as a source of authority against us, but their own previous round of racism-busting was targeted at Foucauldian security studies (Howell and RichterMontpetit, 2019). Now the scene gets not only absurd but authoritarian. You become a racist if you use any source that H&RM deem to be racist. They themselves draw on something they deemed racist in previous work. Since they are not self-labelling as racists, this places interpretative power with the accuser.

H&RM write that ‘much orthodox and critical Western social and political thought is predicated upon epistemological and ontological premises that are not simply Eurocentric but racist, specifically white supremacist’ (H&RM, 2020: 4 [2]). Then, H&RM should explore the entanglement of international relations in this system and its implications. Instead of analysing securitization theory in relation to such a systemic understanding, H&RM imitate a close reading of securitization theory, pretending to make their points from our texts, while de facto reaching their conclusions from anywhere but our texts themselves.

### Alternative Fails – Can’t Escape Link

#### Alternative scholarship can’t escape dilemma of security focus

Coleman, University of Sussex International Relations Professor, 21 (Lara Montesinos, “Racism! What do you mean? From Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s underestimation of the problem, towards situating security through struggle”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 69-77, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

Howell and Richter-Montpetit seek to extend this important work to security studies. However, the question is whether security studies faces specific challenges in addressing its colonial intellectual foundations, which arise from its very self-definition as a field. Security has long been ‘the supreme concept of bourgeois society’ (Neocleous, 2008: 11). The epistemic conditions of even the most critical scholarship continue to be shaped not only by the neoliberal academy, with its racialized, class-based and gendered obstacles to admittance, but also by what we look for when we are part of part of a ‘we’ (see Foucault, 1984: 385), organized around the problematization of security. Disciplines, after all, revolve around the problems that they generate - problems that, in their very framing, imply particular ontological assumptions.

What is remarkable about critical security studies is that scholars - particularly those working in a Foucauldian tradition - acknowledge that the liberal preoccupation with security serves to mask relations of power and violence. They acknowledge that it is not ‘all about security’, but still re-centre security in the very process of calling it into question. The risk is that the (liberal) identi- fication of normality with peace and neutrality is reinforced, that an ideological fantasy is solidi- fied by its constant repetition in practice (Coleman and Rosenow, 2016: 214). Even when liberal accounts of politics are subject to critique, starting from a concern with security (even broadly conceived) can still mean that other relations of violence fade out of view. The world is, in effect, collapsed into a disciplinary perspective (see Gordon, 2011: 99).

### Alternative Offense – Turns K

#### Alt fails and triggers the impact- the kritik waters down anti-racist discourse

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

This is only a taster of all that is academically flawed about H&RM’s article, and we hope readers will now turn to our longer reply. H&RM’s sloppy scholarship and thorough misrepresentations of what they attack discredit both them and Security Dialogue. There is no basis for H&RM’s overarching charge of the theory being racist other than their assertion that all Western social science is systemically racist. Racism is an accusation that should not be made lightly, because being branded as racist obviously has severe human and social costs. To accuse peers in the discipline of racism should be a difficult decision, strongly conditioned by the credibility of the evidence and the specificity of the charge. H&RM present no politico-academic reasoning explaining their decision to cross what is usually a clear line for academic debate. By publishing the article, Security Dialogue supports this transgression. H&RM write in a straightforward, declaratory/authoritative style, as though their article simply presents ‘how it really is’, not a complex decision involving concerns about responsibility and effects. This is doubly puzzling given that our main texts include explicit ethical and political self-reflections about the possible value and risks involved in coining concepts and shaping theories in particular ways (contra H&RM’s unfounded postulate that we present the theory as ‘neutral’; see H&RM, 2020: 3, 11, 16 [1, 9, 14]).

H&RM’s article is dangerously counterproductive to the important task of dealing with systemic racism in international relations. Debasing the currency of academic analysis will steer the discipline into a post-truth direction antithetical to its epistemological integrity and social purpose. The power of racism in the world today and its partaking in our discipline are far too serious to be channelled into polemics against made-up targets. H&RM water down the meaning of racism so that it captures practically everyone in social science. Having deemed postcolonial scholarship not radical enough, they have set up a machine that will judge any theory racist unless it foregrounds race in their specific jargon of ‘methodological whiteness’ and ‘antiblack racism’. Any theory not centred on racism in their sense is racist – not just more or less capable of analysing racism, but ‘racist’, ‘antiblack’ and ‘white supremacist’. International relations certainly needs to engage the question of racism – both as crucial in world politics and as an internal challenge entrenched within the historical constitution of the discipline – but not like this.

We think Security Dialogue should retract the article because its deepfake methodology can be used to ‘prove’ anything. H&RM’s practices, like falsely attributed quotes and systematic disregard of countervailing evidence, void their central argument and amount to serious academic misconduct. Such flawed work should not warrant publication in a leading academic journal.